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Abstract
Among the determinants of economic freedom, the presence of different ethnic 
groups within a country has sometimes been explored by the empirical literature, 
without conclusive evidence on the sign of the relation, its drivers, and the con-
ditions under which it holds. This paper offers new evidence by empirically mod-
elling how ethnic fragmentation is related to economic freedom, as measured by 
the Economic Freedom Index and by each of its numerous areas, components and 
sub-components. The results provide insights on the components driving the effect 
and, interestingly, detect notable differences between developed and developing 
countries.
Keywords Economic freedom · Indices of economic freedom · Institutional quality · 
Ethnic fragmentation
JEL classification O10 · O43 · C33 · C36
1 Introduction
The role of institutions in promoting economic growth is a major field of study for 
economists since the second half of the twentieth century (North, 1990; Rodrik, 
2007). Indices of economic freedom represent a widely accepted way to measure the 
quality of the institutions that are relevant for economic growth (Gwartney, 2009; 
Williamson and Mathers, 2011), at least if we assume a liberal view of econom-
ics and the functioning of economies. Yet, institutions are not exogenous, as they 
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depend on the decisions and policies enacted by the national (and sometimes inter-
national) governing bodies. Such bodies are not independent of the internal situa-
tions of the countries that they rule: as Reilly (2000) highlights, one of the major 
factors that affect policies is the presence of different ethnic groups within a country. 
Indeed, these typically claim the right to protection for their cultural traits and rep-
resentation in elected bodies; in some cases, ethnic differences result in tensions and 
conflicts, so hampering economic activity (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). As a con-
sequence, institutions, as measured by economic freedom indices, may also mediate 
the effect of ethnic diversity on economic growth; in this regard, the present study 
aims at inquiring into the effects that ethnic fragmentation has on economic freedom 
and its different areas, components and sub-components.
Literature exists on the relationship between ethnic fragmentation and economic 
freedom. However, as the next section will show in more detail, there is no con-
clusive evidence about how ethnic fragmentation affects economic freedom: some 
scholars find positive influence, while others show the opposite. Moreover, all the 
existing indices of economic freedom are composite measures of various insti-
tutional dimensions, as they result from aggregations of sub- and sub-sub-indices 
that assess the quality of different institutional aspects. While among these aspects 
multiple correlations generally exist, they may be only partial and, in some cases, 
they may take opposite signs. The extant literature has then analyzed the relation-
ship between ethnic fragmentation and single components of the aggregated indi-
ces of economic freedom, again finding mixed evidence. Few studies, conversely, 
have inquired into the effect of ethnic fragmentation on a broader set of components 
(Heckelman and Wilson, 2018; Alhassan and Kilishi 2019; Soysa and Almas 2019; 
Murphy, 2015; Nikolaev and Salahodjaev, 2017). For example, Alhassan and Kili-
shi (2019) consider a sample of 43 Sub-Saharan countries and inquire how ethnic, 
linguistic and religious fragmentation affects economic freedom (they use the index 
calculated by the Heritage Foundation) and four of its components.1 Analogously, 
Heckelman and Wilson (2018) estimate the impact of ethnic and linguistic frac-
tionalization on five dimensions of economic freedom in a sample of 117 countries 
observed at six points in time between 1975 and 2002, while de Soysa and Almas 
(2019) analyze the effects of ethnic diversity on economic freedom and five subcom-
ponents for 150 countries over 24 years (1991–2015). However, to the best of our 
knowledge, no previous work has adopted a more detailed approach to investigate 
the relationship between ethnic fragmentation and the full set of the numerous com-
ponents and sub-components of economic freedom in a large sample of countries. 
The first novelty of the analysis presented here is therefore the level of detail. The 
empirical analysis indeed will show how ethnic fragmentation relates to economic 
freedom and all its many dimensions (measured by 50 different sub-indicators), as 
defined in the report Economic Freedom of the World, annually published by the 
Fraser Institute. The reason why this paper goes so in depth is to understand whether 
1 Also Islam and Montenegro (2002) analyze how ethnic fragmentation is related to different indices of 
institutional quality and their components in large samples of countries. However, they do not specifi-
cally focus on economic freedom but rather on the quality of institutions in general.
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the effects detected (or not) on the global indices are driven by any particular com-
ponents and sub-components.
The second novelty is that the analysis also presents and discusses the results 
separately for developed and developing countries. On the one hand, the stage of 
economic development may play a role, affecting the perception of ethnic divisions 
(Sundaram and Hui 2003). On the other hand, in most developing economies, ethnic 
differences are a characteristic of the country, as different ethnic groups were pre-
sent when the postcolonial country was founded; instead, many developed countries 
are ethnically diversified more as a consequence of immigration waves than because 
various ethnic groups were already present. The dynamics that govern the relation 
between ethnic fractionalization and economic freedom can then differ between the 
two groups of countries. As some works suggest (see the next section), this differ-
ence may be crucial.
The main results of the analysis show that: (1) the effect of ethnic fragmenta-
tion on economic freedom differs according to the component of economic freedom 
considered; (2) such effect also differs between developed and developing countries. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a general review 
of the relevant literature on the potential positive and negative impacts of ethnic 
fractionalization on economic freedom, which will orient the interpretation of the 
results. Section 3 presents the methodology and data used in the empirical analysis. 
Section 4 reports and discusses the main findings, while the last section concludes.
2  Literature review
Economists have widely studied the relationship between ethnic fragmentation and 
growth. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) present an extensive review of the literature, 
showing that ethnic fragmentation is generally found to reduce economic growth. 
In particular, the relationship between the two is mediated by the public policies 
adopted by governments, as ethnic fragmentation and divisions largely influence 
economic policies reducing their effectiveness and efficiency. Easterly and Lev-
ine (1997) identify political instability, distorted exchange rates, and high govern-
ment deficits as major institutional drawbacks that lower economic growth and are 
explained by ethnic fragmentation. Analogously, Papyrakis and Mo (2014) find that 
ethnic fractionalization reduces economic growth, the most important transmission 
channel being represented by corruption. These results are consistent with those 
found by Mauro (1995), who shows that the efficiency of judicial systems corre-
lates negatively with ethnolinguistic fragmentation; this in turn, increases political 
instability and corruption, thus hindering both the quality of institutions and the eco-
nomic performance. The author concludes that ethnolinguistic fragmentation ham-
pers economic growth through its effects on the aforementioned institutional varia-
bles. Alesina et al. (1999) provide further empirical evidence on the negative effects 
of ethnic fragmentation studying the provision of local public goods in the U.S.A. 
In general, the literature finds a negative correlation between ethnic fragmentation 
and the quality of government and economic governance (La Porta et al. 1999), and 
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more recently, Churchill and Smyth (2017) show that ethnic diversity increases pov-
erty, and thus reduces growth.
Further research refines the empirical evidence provided by the cited works, 
inquiring into the relationship between ethnic fragmentation and some institutional 
variables related to economic growth, showing that this last depends on the qual-
ity of institutions (North, 2002 and Acemoglu et al., 2005), which in turn requires 
appropriate policies, as good institutions are created by good policies (Glaeser et al., 
2004).2 Alonso and Garcimartín (2013) show that ethnic fragmentation reduces 
the quality of institutions through engendering more income inequality and less 
growth. Moreover, works exist that highlight the mediation effect of institutions 
between ethnic diversity and economic outcomes (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 
2005 and Chadha and Nandwani, 2018). There are several institutions that favour 
growth, and there are many different ways to measure them (Woodruff, 2006 and 
Chong and Gradstein, 2007); one is represented by the various existing indices of 
economic freedom (Hall and Lawson, 2014), which aim at summarizing the qual-
ity of the institutions that are relevant for growth in a liberal perspective. The con-
cept of economic freedom is of particular importance in institutional approaches, 
and many articles and books have appeared on it, showing that economic freedom 
fosters growth (Gwartney et al., 1999; Berggren, 2003; Gwartney, 2009 and Hall and 
Lawson, 2014), political freedom (Friedman, 1982)3 and happiness (Hall and Law-
son, 2014). In particular, the several components of economic freedom (Gwartney 
et al., 2005) may guide the choices of policy-makers. Moreover, given the evidence 
on the relationship between ethnic diversity and economic growth, and the sugges-
tions that this effect is not direct, but mediated by institutional factors (Glaeser et al., 
2004 and, more recently, Karnane and Quinn, 2019), investigating the impact of eth-
nic fragmentation on economic freedom seems relevant.
As mentioned above, the indices of economic freedom are comprehensive meas-
ures, which include several indicators of different institutional aspects affecting the 
structure of an economy. Several different indices were proposed over time; how-
ever, de Haan and Sturm (2000) suggest that they measure almost the same phe-
nomenon and are therefore almost equivalent to each other. The domains of such 
indices represent the soundness of the legal framework and the level and quality 
of regulation of economic activities,4 the weight of governmental interventions in 
the economy, the freedom to trade internationally and the money soundness.5 Ethnic 
2 The literature on this topic is vast; the aim of the paper is not, however, to survey it.
3 However, Pryor (2010) shows that Friedman’s claim should be mitigated, as economic freedom pro-
motes political freedom through the educational system.
4 These domains are covered by most of the relevant indices. The legal framework is covered by the 
Fraser EFI index as “Legal system and property rights”, by the Heritage Foundation (HF) as “Rule of 
law” (heritage.org/index) and by the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (info.world-
bank.org/governance/wgi). The level and quality of regulation is also covered by the three of them 
respectively as Regulation/Regulatory efficiency/Regulatory quality.
5 These domains are covered by the Fraser EFI and by the HF as Size of Government/Limited Govern-
ment and Freedom to Trade internationally/Open markets respectively, while inflation and money sound-
ness are a domain in the Fraser EFI (Sound Money) and a component of Monetary Freedom (under Regu-
latory efficiency) in the HF index. These domains are not covered by the WGI which includes instead: 
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fragmentation may affect some of these institutional variables, and thus the com-
posite index, as the political instability due to ethnic fragmentation may hinder, for 
instance, the protection of property rights (Svensson, 1998 and Busse and Hefeker, 
2007). More generally, Polidano (2000), Alesina et al. (2011) and Root (2018) show 
that ethnolinguistic fractionalization may decrease the level of economic freedom 
by worsening, in particular, government effectiveness and the quality of regulation. 
More recently, Lawson et al. (2020) present a survey of the literature on factors that 
affect economic freedom: the authors confirm that, in general, articles present evi-
dence on ethnic diversity as a factor reducing economic freedom. Faria et al. (2016) 
claim instead that genetic diversities are associated with an increase in economic 
freedom up to a certain point, after which they have an opposite effect.
Further empirical evidence shows that ethnic fragmentation worsens the rule of 
law and the protection of property rights (Baggio and Papyrakis 2010). Moreover, 
Glaeser and Saks (2006), Papyriakis and Mo (2014) and de Soysa and Almas (2019) 
highlight that ethnic diversity is generally associated with high levels of corruption. 
Papyriakis and Mo (2014), in particular, shows that the results do not change quali-
tatively if an index of either ethnic polarization or fractionalization is used.
Other components of the index of economic freedom may be negatively affected 
by ethnic fragmentation. Although in presence of high ethnic fractionalization gov-
ernments tend to provide less public goods (Alesina et al., 1999) and transfers (Ales-
ina et  al., 2003 and Alesina and Glaeser, 2004), Annett (2001) shows that where 
ethnic diversity leads to conflicts, governments may increase public expenditure 
with the aim of appeasing oppositions and tensions. The author also shows that such 
policies are, on average, successful, with positive effects on growth. The evidence is 
however inconclusive, as opposite tendencies are at work, and it is not clear which 
prevails (Stichnoth and Van der Staeten, 2013). Considering instead international 
trade, Mohr and Shoobridge (2011) hypothesize that firms with ethnically diversi-
fied workforce are more able to trade internationally, as they have more experience 
with different tastes and preferences. Empirical analyses seem to provide ground for 
this hypothesis (Parrotta et al., 2016).
The evidence on the negative influence of ethnic fragmentation on economic 
freedom is however challengeable. Sunde et  al. (2008) use countries whose mean 
absolute latitude is smaller than 23.5 degrees6 to inquire into the effects of ethnic 
fragmentation on the quality of the rule of law and show that ethnic fragmentation 
has almost no effect on this component of economic freedom. Similarly, investigat-
ing convergence in economic freedom, Hall (2016) finds no significant effects of 
ethnic fractionalization. Analyzing a sample of 117 countries between 1975 and 
2012, Heckelman and Wilson (2018) find that ethnic and linguistic fragmentation 
boosts economic freedom in the most democratic countries. Analogously, using a 
number of different measures of ethnic diversity, de Soysa et al. (2011) notice that 
6 See Easterly (2003).
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, and 
Control of Corruption.
Footnote 5 (continued)
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ethnic diversity promotes economic freedom through the reduction of power con-
centration and political dissent. The positive association between diversity and var-
ious components of economic freedom is confirmed also in de Soysa and Almas 
(2019), consistently with Masella (2013), who observes that high ethnic fragmen-
tation reduces nationalist sentiments among small minorities. This may in turn 
reduce the level of social conflicts, thus leading to an environment that is favourable 
to growth and economic freedom. Considering Sub-Saharan Africa, between 1995 
and 2017, Alhassan and Kilishi (2019) find that ethnic diversity increases aggregate 
economic freedom, although this result is not robust in all the analyses presented in 
their article and the effects on the single components of the index are not statisti-
cally significant. However, the authors claim that ethnic diversity may provide impe-
tus to economic freedom, through the development of stronger institutions. Clark 
et al. (2015) show that the increase in ethnic fragmentation experienced by advanced 
economies as a consequence of immigration flows does not affect or—at most—
slightly improves the quality of institutions such as protection of property rights and 
rule of law. In this case, ethnic diversity is “imported” rather being connatural to the 
country; therefore the differences between developed and developing countries may 
depend on the origin of ethnic fragmentation (Wright 2012). In addition, the empiri-
cal literature provides evidence that people’s support to economic liberal policies is, 
on average, negatively correlated with per-capita income in a sample of advanced 
countries (Migheli 2014), which are generally characterized by low levels of ethnic 
fragmentation. However, when the two largest emerging economies by population 
size are considered, the opposite seems to hold (Migheli 2010). This confirms the 
importance of treating developed and developing countries separately.
Finally, many authors use ethnic fractionalization as a control variable when 
modelling economic freedom or its individual components; however they find lim-
ited significance (Norton 2000; March et al. 2017) or contrasting results and do not 
address potential endogeneity of ethnic fractionalization, as they focus on other 
main explanatory variables, like democracy (Hall 2016), aid (Kilby, 2005; Heck-
elman and Knack, 2008; Young and Sheehan, 2014; Schlosky and Young, 2017), 
inequality (Murphy, 2015), and historical presence of infectious diseases (Nikolaev 
and Salahodjaev, 2017).
From the findings of extant literature, it is clear that ethnic fractionalization can 
have a number of potential negative and positive impacts on the overall degree of 
economic freedom and its different dimensions, the ultimate effect being thus uncer-
tain. Such findings are synthesized in Table  1, which provides an outlook of the 
extant theoretical and empirical literature that can facilitate the interpretation of the 
empirical results presented in Sect. 4.
3  Data and methodology
The empirical analysis aims at testing whether a relation between economic free-
dom and ethnic fractionalization exists, considering an initial panel of 82 developing 
and developed countries observed between 2000 and 2013. Given the limitations 
of the existing data sources, the sample size and the time coverage depend on data 
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Table 1  Some potential negative and positive impacts of ethnic fractionalization on economic freedom
Lower government 
effectiveness and 
quality of regulation 
because of ethnic 
and linguistic differ-
ences and the higher 
heterogeneity in 
preferences
Alesina et al. (1999, 
2003, 2011); La Porta 
et al. (1999); Polidano 
(2000); Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2005); Root 
(2018)
Larger impetus to 








Alhassan and Kilishi (2019); 
Olson (1982, 2000)
High levels of corrup-
tion reduce the rule 
of law and the pro-
tection of property 
rights
Mauro (1995); Glaeser 
and Saks (2006); 
Baggio and Papyrakis 
(2010); Papyriakis and 
Mo (2014)
Reduction of power 
concentration and 
political dissent
De Soysa et al. (2011)
In less democratic 
regimes, minorities 
more vulnerable 
and targeted by the 
autocrat’s rent seek-
ing behavior through 
more regulation
Heckelman and Wilson 
(2018)
In more democratic 
regimes, more polit-
ical competition and 
less successful rent 
seeking behaviors





and, in particular, 
the protection of 
property rights
Svensson (1998); Busse 
and Hefeker (2007)
Reduction of national-
ist sentiments and 
of social conflicts 
among small 
minorities, leading 




Where ethnic diversity 
leads to conflicts, 
increased public 
expenditure to 
appease both the 
oppositions and the 
tensions
Annett (2001) Smaller governments 
and, then, lower 
provision of public 
goods
Easterly and Levine (1997); 
Alesina et al. (1999); 
Alesina et al. (2003); 
Alesina and Glaeser 
(2004)
When ethnic fragmen-
tation is a conse-
quence of immigra-
tion, natives asking 
for more market and 
social regulations 
because of social ten-
sions; legal systems 
tending to accommo-
date natives’ opposi-
tion to immigration, 
being sterner with 






meier (2004); Ruhs 





of immigration it 
improves property 
rights’ protection 
and the rule of 
law, as a long-run 
outcome of the 
political preferences 
of immigrants and a 
part of natives
Clark et al. (2015)
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availability. The analysis first pools all the countries together, and then splits them 
into developing (low- and middle-income) and developed (high-income) econo-
mies.7 The list of countries is reported in the appendix (Table 9). As emerged from 
the literature review, the dynamics that relate economic freedom to ethnic fractional-
ization can indeed differ according to the level of development (Lawson et al. 2020), 
and, consequently, studying them separately may provide more insightful results.
Economic freedom is measured through the index computed by the Fraser 
Institute, which monitors and surveys the level of economic freedom in the world 
through the publication of the report Economic Freedom of the World (EFW). The 
report was first presented in 1996 (Gwartney et al. 1996) and then published yearly 
since 2000 (Gwartney et al. 2019). According to the Institute, “economic freedom 
is present when economic activity is coordinated by personal choice, voluntary 
exchange, open markets, and clearly defined and enforced property rights. People 
are economically free when they are permitted to choose for themselves and engage 
in voluntary transactions as long as they do not harm the person or property of oth-
ers” (Gwartney et al., 2016, p. 5).
The EFW Report provides a numerical assessment—between 0 and 10—of the 
degree of market liberalization in a country, where higher values represent greater 
economic freedom. Specifically, the index measures the degree of economic free-
dom calculated as the average of the scores obtained in five different areas, which 
are, in turn, average scores of relevant components and sub-components.8 The defi-
nition of the five areas, based on Gwartney et al. 2019, is as follows. Size of govern-
ment captures the size of government spending, taxation, and government-controlled 
enterprises in an economy. Legal system and property rights is about separation of 
powers and their proper functioning, and closely relates to the notion of rule of law. 
Sound money is mostly about inflation, which, according to the index proponents, 
affects the capacity of individuals to use economic freedom effectively by eroding 
the value of their wages and savings and introducing uncertainty about future val-
ues. Freedom to trade internationally covers freedom to trade and do business with 
Table 1  (continued)
Increased national-
ist consumption by 
natives as a reaction 
to ethnic fractionali-
zation deriving from 
immigration





able and willing to 
trade internation-
ally, as they have 
more experience 
with different tastes 
and preferences
Casella and Rauch (2001, 
2003); Mohr and Shoo-
bridge (2011); Parrotta 
et al. (2016)
7 Our subsamples are based on the World Bank classification of countries operated according to their per 
capita GNI (Atlas methodology).
8 The number of components and sub-components ranges from four (for the area Sound Money) to 
eighteen (for the area Regulation). It should be noticed that a higher score always corresponds to more 
economic freedom, regardless the name of areas and components, which, in some cases, can be mislead-
ing. For example, countries scoring high in the area “Size of government” or in the component “Money 
growth” are the ones characterized by small size/growth, rather than big. Additional information can be 
found here: https:// www. frase rinst itute. org/ econo mic- freed om/ appro ach
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firms and individuals in other nations and includes tariff and non-tariff trade barri-
ers and controls to the movements of capital and people. Finally, regulation refers 
to regulation of the credit and labour markets and regulations of business activities. 
Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients between the aggregate index and each of 
its macro-components and the analogous coefficients calculated between the macro-
components. Some correlations are small, and one is negative; the figures thus sug-
gest that the exclusive use of the aggregated index may hide some of the effects 
of its components. Partial compensations of the effects, for instance, are possible 
because of the negative correlation between the size-of-government and the legal-
system-and-property-rights areas.
The degree of ethnic fractionalization is retrieved from Drazanova (2019), whose 
work is based on the percentages of main ethnic groups provided by the CREG data-
set (Nardulli et al. 2012).9 The shares of country population by ethnic group (s) are 
calculated, cleaned, and aggregated by Drazanova (2019) to compute an index (EFR) 
corresponding to the probability that two randomly selected individuals from coun-
try i at time t are not from the same ethnic group. This index is given by the value of 
one minus a Herfindal-Hirshman index, also in line with Alesina et al. (2003):
The index is then used as an independent variable in regressions, where the 
dependent variable is the level of economic freedom; a series of control variables 
are also included in the specifications presented in this paper, so that the estimated 
equations take the following general form:
where i and t denote country and years respectively; EFIit is the level of economic 
freedom, alternatively measured by either the composite index of economic freedom 
or its single areas, components and sub-components; EFRit is the degree of ethnic 
fractionalization; XK,it is a vector of K control variables that the extant literature has 
found to affect the level of economic freedom; uit is the error term.
The selection of control variables is largely based on the studies reviewed by 
Lawson et al. (2020), who survey and discuss the main findings of the existing lit-
erature on the determinants of economic freedom. As countries with a higher level 
of democracy and political and human rights have been proven to be characterized 
by greater economic freedom, the set of control variables includes both aspects. The 
first is captured by a dummy variable representing the nature of the country regime, 













9 The Composition of Religious and Ethnic Groups project (CREG), initiated by the Cline Center for 
Democracy, is based on the Geo-Referencing of Ethnic Groups project (GREG), which was crosschecked 
and validated through the Britannica Book of the Year (BBOY), the CIA World Factbook (CIA-WF) and 
the World Almanac Book of Facts (WABF). The Encyclopaedia Britannica and the CIA World Factbook 
(CIA-WF) are also used by Alesina et  al. (2003) for their proposed index. Compared to other similar 
indices, the main advantage of the CREG index is that the dynamics of ethnic groups are modelled and 
the shares are projected over time, thus allowing the calculation of a time variant index.
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based on data from the Polity IV database, where regimes scoring from 6 to 10 are 
classified as democracies.10 The level of political and human rights is taken from the 
Political Terror Scale dataset, described in detail in Wood and Gibney (2010), which 
provides measures of violation of physical integrity rights carried out by States or 
their agents.11
Inequality is another factor that was proven to affect economic freedom, as high 
concentration of economic power fosters rent-seeking behaviors that preserve the 
status quo from the effects of liberal reforms (Alonso and Garcimartín 2013; Krieger 
and Meierrieks 2016; Lawson et al. 2020). Moreover, even if Lawson et al. (2020) 
show that the results of the extant literature are mixed, it seems that also the level of 
per capita income can affect the reform orientation of a country. Therefore, the real 
GDP per capita (from World Development Indicators—WDI) and the Gini index 
(from World Inequality Database—WID)12 are included as regressors.
Finally, the amount of foreign aid that a country receives is an additional factor that can 
influence the level of economic freedom, especially when it is conditional on the imple-
mentation of political and institutional reforms (see Lawson et al. 2020, for a review of 
relevant literature). As developing countries are the main beneficiaries of development 
aid, the analysis controls for this effect through the amount of Net Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GNI (source: WDI) limited to the sub-sample of 
developing economies. Further documentation on variables and data sources is available in 
Table 10, while Table 11 presents descriptive statistics (see Appendix).
To perform a series of tests for identifying the most appropriate estimation 
model, Eq. 2 is estimated using country fixed-effects regressions to control for time-
invariant country characteristics and taking the composite EFI as the dependent 
variable (Table 3, Columns 2, 5, 8, 11). The same estimates are also run using ran-
dom-effect regressions (Table 3, Columns 1, 4, 7, 10), then a Hausman specification 
test (Hausman, 1978) is used to select the most efficient between the two estima-
tors. After selecting it, the model is estimated again, using a two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) instrumental variables (IV) approach and treating ethnic fractionalization 
as endogenous, because of the potential reverse causality with economic freedom 
(Table 3, Columns 3, 6, 9, 12). Indeed, if the level of ethnic fractionalization can 
affect the degree of economic freedom, also the opposite may occur. In other words, 
the sense of membership to ethnic groups may be stronger when the absence of for-
mal institutions is cause of insufficient provision of some goods and services (for 
example justice, protection of property rights, etc.), that conversely are provided by 
the ties between the members and the traditions of the group. For example, country 
10 In the democ index, democracy is conceived as three elements: the presence of institutions and proce-
dures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders, the 
existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive, the guarantee of civil 
liberties to all citizens. See http:// www. syste micpe ace. org/ polit yproj ect. html for details.
11 The dataset provides three separate indicators, each based on information contained in the annual 
reports published respectively by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the US Department 
of State Country Reports (Haschke 2017). Because of the high number of available observations, the 
authors prefer to rely on the last source.
12 The World Inequality Database initiative was started in 2011 and is funded by public and non-profit 
institutions, mostly European Universities and Research Centres: https:// wid. world/ data/.
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institutions, such as a stronger legal system or a better protection of property rights, 
could substitute the informal institutions based on ethnicity, which in turn may par-
tially lose their raison d’être (Ahlerup and Olsson 2012).
While under some circumstances the lagged levels of the explanatory vari-
ables can be taken as instruments (DeJong and Ripoll 2006; Reed 2015; Dithmer 
and Abdulai 2017), their large use in the recent literature has been highly debated 
(Bellemare et  al. 2017), especially when the underlying process is persistent over 
time (Panizza and Presbitero 2014) and the lag length is short. This also limits their 
validity as internal instruments in the Generalized Method of Moments estima-
tor (Arellano and Bond 1991) for linear dynamic panel data models (Panizza and 
Presbitero 2014).13 The first best is then to find an alternative valid instrument. The 
political and economics literature provides several explanations for the level of eth-
nic diversity and fragmentation in a country (Alesina et al. 2003; Kaufmann 2011 
and 2015; Ahlerup and Olsson 2012), among which geographical size, latitude, 
the date of country formation, founding date of the largest ethnic group, level of 
democracy and population density. As most of the mentioned variables are either 
time invariant or expected to be highly correlated with our dependent variable (like 
the level of democracy), population density as an instrument for ethnic fractionaliza-
tion appears appropriate. Indeed, the geographic proximity with other people and 
cultures seems to affect ethnic diversity, fractionalization and identity. On the one 
hand, higher population density can lead people to conform (Wimmer et al. 2009; 
Kaufmann 2011; Ahlerup and Olsson 2012). On the other hand, under some circum-
stances (for example when resources are scarce), high population density can favour 
the rise of conflicts (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998; Acemoglu et  al. 2019) which, in 
turn, reinforce social and ethnic identity (Sambanis and Shayo 2013). The relevance 

























Economic freedom index 
(EFI)
1.000
Size of Government 
(SoG)
0.273*** 1.000
Legal system and prop-
erty rights (LSPR)
0.795*** − 0.146*** 1.000
Sound money (SM) 0.832*** 0.111*** 0.547*** 1.000
Freedom to trade interna-
tionally (FtTI)
0.874*** 0.121*** 0.653*** 0.724*** 1.000
Regulation (Reg) 0.779*** 0.084*** 0.634*** 0.521*** 0.602*** 1.000
13 Bond (2002) and Panizza and Presbitero (2014) also note that GMM estimators are not appropriate for 
cross-country datasets that necessarily have a small number of units.
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of the selected instrument is verified through the Anderson-Rubin-Wald test (Ander-
son and Rubin 1949), while the endogeneity of ethnic fractionalization is tested by 
means of Davidson and MacKinnon’s test of exogeneity (Davidson and MacKinnon 
1993) and Hausman specification test (Hausman 1978). Such tests led to the selec-
tion of the most appropriate estimation method.
The exclusive use of population density as an instrument for ethnic fractionalization 
can nonetheless be questionable, so that testing the robustness of the results to the adop-
tion of alternative strategies seems necessary. One could indeed argue that population 
density may sometimes be a rough proxy for the level of industrialization and structural 
change, which in turn can directly correlate with the degree of economic freedom, thus 
violating the exclusion restriction. To minimize the potential correlation of population 
density with the error term, its 40-year lagged value is used as an alternative instrument 
to its current values.14 Moreover, the robustness of the main results is further checked 
using alternative time-variant instruments, drawn from the existing literature on the 
determinants of ethnic fractionalization: per capita arable land, accounting for geo-
graphic factors that may have influenced spatial concentration and endogenous group 
formation (Ashraf and Galor 2013); time distance from the country foundation, based 
on the hypothesis that, in older countries, ethnic fusion or, conversely, ethnic conflicts, 
which reinforce ethnic identity, have had more time to take place affecting the degree of 
ethnic fractionalization (Kaufmann 2011 and 2015); the world and regional average lev-
els of ethnic fractionalization, which can capture potential common trends at a global or 
regional level due to international issues like inter-country migration and global/regional 
economic and political dynamics (Gurr 2000; Campos and Kuzeyev 2007); the 30-year 
lagged values of ethnic fractionalization.15The relevance of each of these alternative 
instruments is assessed through the Anderson-Rubin-Wald test and results are presented 
in Sect. 4.2 (Table 7).16
Finally, a common practice to check the validity of the exclusion restrictions is to 
add the instrument to the set of right-hand side variables in the IV estimations. The 
exclusion restrictions for our main instrument, population density, is then assessed 
when it is included as a regressor in the IV estimations that use the above-mentioned 
alternative instruments for ethnic fractionalization. The validity of the exclusion 
restrictions is confirmed if the coefficient of the variable is either not statistically 
significant or close to zero (Table 8).
4  Results
Table  3 reports the panel estimates of Eq.  2 under different specifications for the 
whole sample and for the two sub-samples of developing and developed countries. 
Hausman specification test indicates a preference for the fixed-effects model over the 
random-effects estimator (columns 2, 5, 8 and 11). When ethnic fractionalization is 
14 The lag length was selected to maximize the time span under data availability constraints.
15 Also in this case, the choice of the lag length is driven by data availability.
16 To control for climatic factors, we also employed the average monthly temperature and the average 
monthly precipitation as alternative instruments for ethnic fractionalization (Ashraf and Galor, 2013). 
However, they turned out to be not relevant according to the Anderson-Rubin Wald tests.
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instrumented with the measure of population density (columns 3, 6, 9 and 12), the 
Anderson-Rubin-Wald test confirms the relevance of the instrument. Moreover, both 
Hausman and Davidson-MacKinnon tests reveal a preference for the fixed-effects 
2SLS-IV estimator, rejecting the hypothesis of exogeneity and confirming that ethnic 
fractionalization should be treated as endogenous. As a consequence, the fixed-effects 
instrumental variable estimator is preferred to the fixed-effects OLS regression in the 
whole sample as well as in the two sub-samples of countries. This choice is con-
firmed also when the lagged values of ethnic fractionalization are used as an alterna-
tive instrument: its relevance is confirmed again by the related Anderson-Rubin-Wald 
test (Table A4 in Appendix). Tables 4 and 5 report the results of 2SLS-IV regressions 
when the different areas, components and sub-components of the economic freedom 
index (EFI) are taken as dependent variables. While Table 4 shows the entire set of 
results for the five areas of economic freedom, Table 5 reports only the coefficients of 
ethnic fractionalization and their level of statistical significance for each component 
and sub-component of the five areas (full results are available upon request).
Considering the global EFI, ethnic fractionalization has a statistically significant effect 
in most of the different specifications and sub-samples, confirming that the level of eco-
nomic freedom may be influenced by the degree of fractionalization (Table 3). In addition, 
the level of democracy and of respect of human and political rights turns out to play an 
important role in determining economic freedom. This is consistent with the extant empiri-
cal literature on the determinants of economic freedom, which finds that countries with 
freer political institutions and greater civil liberties have also higher degrees of economic 
freedom (see Lawson et al. 2020, for an accurate survey).
The coefficient of ethnic fractionalization has positive sign and is statistically significant 
in the whole sample and in the sub-sample of developing countries, but it takes the oppo-
site sign–always being statistically significant–in the sub-sample of developed economies. 
This supports the idea that the dynamics that govern the relation between ethnic fractional-
ization and economic freedom differ according to the level of development. The results for 
the whole sample and the sub-sample of developing economies are consistent with some 
evidence already provided by the literature (and discussed in Sect. 2), which tries to explain 
the phenomenon claiming that ethnically diverse societies may find impetus in this diver-
sity to improve their institutions in order to generate growth, as this last may appease social 
tensions due to ethnic differences (Alhassan and Kilishi, 2019). Nonetheless, the difference 
between developing and developed countries is a major reason to analyze the individual 
areas and components of the index more in depth and also calls for an assessment of the 
robustness of these initial results to the use of different specifications and samples. From a 
statistical point of view, indeed, the estimated effect on a composite variable represents the 
average effect on all its components. This could imply that, for instance, positive and nega-
tive forces may be at work and mutually cancel or reinforce their effects.
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4.1  Decomposing the index of economic freedom
When considering the five areas included in the index, it emerges that the signifi-
cant impact found on the overall level of economic freedom actually stems from the 
effects that fractionalization has on some areas only, as it does not show any statis-
tical association with other areas (Table 4). Also in this case, results differ across 
the two sub-samples of countries. In particular, in developing countries ethnic frac-
tionalization seems to have no impact on government size, while it increases all the 
remaining areas of economic freedom. The neutral effect on the size of government 
can be explained through the evidence already provided by the literature (Stichnoth 
and van der Straeten 2013): as discussed in Sect. 2, ethnic diversity may have the 
effect of increasing some items of public budgets, while decreasing others.
The positive association between ethnic fractionalization and the other areas of 
EFI may be explained through two channels. On the one hand, as ethnic diversity 
causes social tensions, the governments of ethnically fractionalized countries may 
have tried to foster economic growth by means of liberalizations with the aim of 
appeasing tensions through economic well-being (Olson 1982 and 2000). On the 
other hand, there may be another explanation for the positive contribution of eth-
nic fractionalization to economic freedom. Historically, countries with high levels 
of ethnic fractionalization have been more exposed to the risk of civil wars (Mon-
talvo and Reynal-Querol 2005) and generally, when a civil war occurs, the higher 
the level of ethnic fragmentation, the higher the price paid by the country for the 
war (Costalli et al. 2017). Therefore, more ethnically fractionalized countries in the 
past may have resorted to international aid more often than the other developing 
countries. As international financial organizations provided aid conditional on the 
adoption of neoliberal reforms during the last twenty years of the twentieth century 
(the so-called Washington Consensus), there may be a positive correlation between 
ethnic fractionalization and the level of EFI (see Duffield 2002).17 In Table 3 (col-
umns 7, 8, 9) and Table 4, the effect of aid on EFI is tested for the period 2000–13, 
but no unambiguous and statistically significant effect is found. However, the liberal 
wave of the Washington Consensus that inspired the reforms suggested to develop-
ing economies was predominant in the 1980s and, especially, in the 1990s (Rodrik 
2006 and Babb 2013), while in the subsequent years other reforms–more focused on 
the specific situation of each country/area and less centred on liberal policies–have 
been recommended by international donors. Therefore, the evidence presented here 
may not capture the effect of the first wave of reforms.
In developed countries, instead, ethnic fractionalization seems to influence the 
EFI negatively only through the freedom to trade internationally and the protec-
tion of personal and property rights. The absence of a statistically significant link 
with the degree of market regulation may depend on two opposite forces identified 
by the literature, especially regarding labour market freedom. On the one hand, 
the more liberal a country is, the larger the flows of immigration it attracts (i.e. 
it imports more ethnic diversity), as Wright (2012) shows. Therefore, one should 
17 Indeed, an ancillary regression of aid on ethnic fractionalization provides evidence of a positive and 
statistically significant association between these two variables.
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18 However, this link works in the opposite direction of the phenomenon inquired in the analysis. Indeed, 
in this case, freedom affects ethnic fragmentation, and not vice-versa; therefore, if the IV approach used 
in the analysis is correct and solves the problems of reverse causality, this effect should not be detected – 
as indeed it is.
19 In addition, Finseraas et  al. (2020) show that immigration in high-income countries has damaging 
effects on domestic workers especially in markets where labor unions are less diffused and have weaker 
bargaining power. Consequently, liberal markets may have seen an increase in labor force unionizing, 
with a decrease in economic freedom levels.
expect to find a positive link between the level of labor market freedom and that of 
ethnic fractionalization.18 On the other hand, the reluctance of the citizens of eco-
nomically advanced countries to accept immigrants increases with the ethnic dis-
tance between themselves and the immigrants (Brader et al. 2008 and Ford 2011). 
Moreover, in liberal economies, firms may tend to prefer immigrant to domestic 
workers (Wright 2012),19 thus increasing social tensions. This suggests that, when 
ethnic differences depend on immigration, they generate social tensions. As part 
of the response to these tensions during the first and a half decade of the twenty-
first century, high-income countries tightened their market and social regulations 
(Ruhs 2018). The lack of a link between ethnic fractionalization and the degree 
of market regulations may therefore result from these opposite trends of openness 
and closure in the labour market.
Conversely, the negative relationship between ethnic fractionalization and trade 
freedom may depend, as the literature suggests, on the fact that in developed coun-
tries natives tend to react to immigration by increasing the consumption of national 
goods – giving rise to nationalist consumption (Balabanis et al. 2001 and Lekakis 
et al. 2017). Such behavior may explain why, as ethnic fractionalization increases, 
trade restrictions do as well: the governments of ethnically fractionalized countries 
may accommodate the increasing consumption nationalism through commercial clo-
sures and barriers against imported goods.
The association between ethnic fractionalization and the level of protection of 
personal and property rights, with ethnic fractionalization limiting rights, is instead 
unexpected in the light of the extant literature. Before commenting on this result, 
therefore, it is necessary to further unpack this indicator, studying the relationship 
between its sub-components and ethnic fractionalization; the same strategy will also 
apply to the other four areas of the index of economic freedom to understand whether 
their effects are actually the balance between different forces. What emerges is that 
as ethnic fractionalization increases, the quality of courts and the independence of 
judicial systems in developed countries seems to worsen. A possible explanation here 
is that where ethnic diversity is mainly an imported phenomenon, as it is in most of 
the economically advanced countries, the legal systems tend to accommodate natives’ 
opposition to immigration, being sterner with the members of minority (immigrated) 
ethnic groups (Steffensmeieri and Demuth 2000; Demuth and Steffensmeier 2004 
and Leiber and Fix 2019). Such discriminations are likely to be stronger where immi-
gration (and thus ethnic fragmentation) is larger. Ethnic discriminations may also 
affect the judicial systems of developing countries. However, as mentioned before, 
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the more ethnically diverse countries are those that probably had more necessity to 
implement pro-growth reforms and that received more international aid in the past 
(and, therefore, more international pressures to improve their policies and their sys-
tems). In such process, aid may have been conditional on the reform of the judicial 
system that have decreased the ethnic bias in courts decisions.
In sum, Table 5 shows that all the five areas of the EFI represent aggregate meas-
ures, whose components and sub-components may be affected by ethnic fragmenta-
tion differently. These results suggest two main considerations: (1) the indices of 
economic freedom should be cautiously used by economists and policy-makers, as 
their composite nature may hide opposite dynamics; (2) ethnic fragmentation has 
diverging effects on the different areas, components and sub-components of the 
index of economic freedom, i.e. it affects different institutions diversely, depending 
on the characteristics and functions of the institutions themselves.
4.2  Robustness analysis
Table  6 shows the robustness analysis for regression in column  3 (full sample) 
and for the analogous regressions in columns 6 and 12 (developing and developed 
countries, respectively) of Table 3. To save space, only the estimates for the coef-
ficient of ethnic fractionalization are reported, while full results are available upon 
request. First, the robustness of the results with regard to each specification is tested 
when the number of regressors is reduced. This allows for containing the problem 
of potentially bad controls. In row 1, the model includes only the main explanatory 
variable of interest, i.e. the index of ethnic fractionalization; the next specification 
includes the GDP per capita (row 2), and then also the Gini coefficient is included 
(row 3); finally, a model in which only the index of ethnic fractionalization and the 
two institutional variables (democracy and human rights) are present as regressors is 
estimated (row 4). The results are robust to all these specifications.
As a next step, the baseline model is estimated through the use of alternative 
methods. To assess the robustness of the results to the sample composition, the anal-
yses employ jackknife (row 5) and bootstrap (row 6) techniques.20 Both methods 
yield similar results which validate our previous findings. Moreover, since economic 
freedom may be persistent over time and the present changes in its level may depend 
on its previous levels, we also estimate a model where the dependent variable is 
expressed as the change in economic freedom, and the level of economic freedom at 
time t-1 is used as additional regressor, coherently with some existing studies (Haan 
and Sturm 2003; Lundström 2005; Pitlik and Wirth 2003; Pitlik 2008; Rode and 
Gwartney 2012). Also in this case, previous results are not significantly altered.
Furthermore, rows 8 to 13 examine alternative country samples. On one side, 
developing countries are divided into low and middle-income economies, and, 
on the other, non-OECD economies are excluded from the sample of developed 
20 With jackknife method, the model estimation is replicated when each observation in the dataset is left 
out at a time, while bootstrapping iteratively resamples the dataset with replacements, drawing alterna-
tive random samples from the original data.
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countries. Next, former communist countries are left out from each of the three 
original samples. Moreover, while we found no outliers through the Hadi procedure 
(Hadi 1992), we alternatively exclude the ten countries with the most extreme values 
of economic freedom and ethnic fractionalization from the sample. Again, the value 
and the statistical significance of the coefficient for ethnic fractionalization do not 
notably change.
As specified in Sect. 3, the composition of the whole sample was the result of data 
availability, in particular with regard to the Gini coefficient. This led to an over-repre-
sentation of African countries as well as to the exclusion of some other relevant econo-
mies. As a last step, we then try to extend the sample by dropping the Gini coefficient 
from the set of regressors (row 14). This allows for including a total of 130 countries. 
The analyses confirm the results for the developing countries. However, while the coef-
ficient for ethnic fractionalization keeps its negative sign, it loses its statistical signifi-
cance in the sub-sample of developed economies. Moreover, to explore the robustness 
Table 8  Test of exclusion restrictions
Robust z statistics in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. + Democracy nearly time invariant 
in the sample of developed countries, thus omitted. The instrument for ethnic fractionalization is the 
40-year lagged level of population density. However, similar results are obtained when alternative instru-
ments, like the 30-year lagged value of ethnic fractionalization and the regional and global degree of 
ethnic fractionalization, are used
All countries Developing countries Developed countries
Ethnic fractionalization 0.006 0.523* − 0.029**
(0.32) (1.92) (− 2.28)
Per capita GDP (log) 0.722*** 0.526** 0.828***
(6.91) (2.26) (3.19)




Human Rights 0.029 0.060 0.072***
(1.36) (1.31) (3.29)
Population density 0.007*** 0.0001 − 0.005
(4.77) (0.03) (− 1.19)
Countries 66 50 21
Observations 776 555 221
F statistic 8.27*** 2.34* 111.63***
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of the results to the exclusion of specific developing regions, we alternatively exclude 
Sub-Saharan African, Asian and Latin American countries from the extended sample of 
developing economies (rows 15, 16 and 17 respectively). From this last step, it emerges 
that the statistical significance of previous results may be partially driven by the African 
countries. Indeed, while the results still hold when we alternatively exclude Asian and 
Latin American economies, the coefficient for ethnic fractionalization loses its statistical 
significance (although maintaining the positive sign) if Sub-Saharan African countries 
are left out. This may be partially due to the considerably lower average degree of ethnic 
fractionalization in the Latin American developing economies with respect to the Sub-
Saharan African region (0.41 versus 0.68), as well as to the higher resistance of some 
Asian countries to the implementation of the full package of neo-liberal reforms during 
the Washington Consensus era and beyond (Beeson and Islam 2005; Lee 2006). How-
ever, conclusions should be cautiously drawn and this creates room for further research, 
as underlined in the next section.
Table  7 reports the results of the robustness analysis that employs the alterna-
tive instruments for ethnic fractionalization. While not reported to save space, the 
Anderson-Rubin-Wald tests always confirm the relevance of each alternative instru-
ment, with the only exception of the 30-years lagged values of ethnic fractionaliza-
tion when the full sample is analyzed. When the instruments are relevant, the results 
of the baseline models are fully confirmed and the coefficients are statistically sig-
nificant in the majority of cases.
Finally, Table  8 shows the results when the IV estimations include our main 
instrument, population density, as a regressor. This procedure allows to test the 
validity of the exclusion restrictions, which is confirmed if the coefficient of the 
variable is either non-significant or close to zero. For the sub-samples of develop-
ing and developed countries, the coefficient for population density is not statistically 
significant and it only becomes statistically significant for the full sample, although 
its effect is very small (coefficient equal to 0.007). While these results are reassur-
ing about the validity of our main instrument, at least in the two sub-samples of 
countries, they confirm the importance of verifying the robustness of the results by 
adopting also alternative instruments, since some weak correlation of the instrument 
with the error term may still exist.
5  Conclusions
The literature review and the empirical analysis provided in the paper highlight the 
complex relationship that exists between ethnic fractionalization and economic free-
dom. The main message that emerges is that high ethnic fragmentation is not neces-
sarily linked to low levels of economic freedom, as some of the previous literature 
conversely suggests. In particular, some developing economies seem to exhibit the 
opposite pattern, while economically advanced countries show mixed evidence.
On the one hand, since ethnic diversity leads to social tensions, the governments 
of more fractionalized countries may have tried to promote economic growth through 
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liberalizations with the aim of appeasing tensions through economic well-being 
(Olson 1982 and 2000; Alhassan and Kilishi, 2019). Moreover, a possible interpreta-
tion of the results is that also the liberal reforms proposed to aid-recipient countries in 
the wake of the Washington Consensus may have played a role. Indeed, more ethni-
cally fragmented countries experienced more economic distress (because of tensions, 
riots, and civil wars) and, therefore, could have benefitted of international aids more 
than the others. As a consequence, these countries could also have received more 
international pressure to adopt liberal policies– at least in the 1980s and the 1990s. 
However, further research should inquire into these aspects more in depth.
On the other hand, while for most of the developing countries ethnic diversity is 
a condition inherited since their foundation and from colonial legacy (Vogt 2018); 
advanced economies, instead, have mostly imported their ethnic diversity through 
migration flows, which are generally directed towards economically freer countries. 
Nevertheless, in these countries, immigration may generate strong oppositions, ask-
ing for more regulation to protect the natives’ interests.
Further research, especially on the effects of immigration on economic freedom, 
is necessary to provide more support to these interpretations. Moreover, since the 
robustness analysis shows that the results for developing countries may be partially 
driven by African economies, further research should better investigate the different 
dynamics linking economic freedom and ethnic fractionalization at regional level, 
while the present conclusions are limited to the specific sample analyzed.
A second result of this paper is to provide evidence for the complex relationship 
between ethnic fractionalization and the index of economic freedom, through the 
effect on its different areas, components and sub-components. Indeed, the empirical 
analysis shows that the impacts of ethnic fractionalization on the composite index of 
economic freedom are the result of different effects; in particular, the value of some 
sub-components seems to decrease when ethnic fractionalization increases, while for 
others the opposite is true. This evidence is important for further research, which may 
consider focusing especially on those sub-components that have stronger and statisti-
cally significant links with ethnic fractionalization and on the reasons behind them.
Appendix
See Tables 9, 10, 11.
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Table 9  List of countries in the 
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Table 11  Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
All countries
Economic Freedom Index 924 6.64 1.01 2.87 8.79
Size of government 924 6.24 1.09 3.21 9.01
Legal system & property rights 924 5.36 1.83 1.47 9.14
Sound money 924 7.89 1.64 0.00 9.86
Freedom to trade internationally 923 6.96 1.25 2.06 9.48
Regulation 924 6.76 1.01 3.55 8.68
Ethnic fractionalization 924 47.62 26.58 2.70 88.40
Population density 924 102.73 120.62 2.18 1,201.57
Per capita GDP 924 16,201 16,470 675 120,366
Per capita GDP (log) 924 8.99 1.34 6.51 11.70
Gini 924 0.51 0.13 0.24 0.78
Democracy 924 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00
Human rights 924 2.38 1.06 1.00 5.00
Net ODA as % of GNI 583 6.94 7.28 -0.25 40.41
Developed countries
Economic Freedom Index 271 7.65 0.43 6.53 8.79
Size of government 271 5.87 1.01 3.77 8.37
Legal system & property rights 271 7.31 1.15 4.43 9.14
Sound money 271 9.40 0.45 6.88 9.86
Freedom to trade internationally 271 8.21 0.58 6.05 9.48
Regulation 271 7.43 0.71 5.39 8.68
Ethnic fractionalization 271 27.54 16.76 6.80 76.50
Population density 271 139.38 133.25 8.74 1,201.57
Per capita GDP 271 12,246.59 18,745.25 120,366.30 38,007.16
Per capita GDP (log) 271 10.50 0.30 9.84 11.70
Gini 271 0.37 0.06 0.28 0.66
Democracy 271 0.97 0.17 0.00 1.00
Human rights 271 1.38 0.56 1.00 4.00
Developing countries
Economic Freedom Index 576 6.10 0.83 2.87 8.11
Size of government 576 6.37 1.14 3.21 9.01
Legal system & property rights 576 4.34 1.34 1.47 7.63
Sound money 576 7.11 1.50 0.00 9.81
Freedom to trade internationally 575 6.27 0.99 2.06 8.49
Regulation 576 6.40 1.00 3.55 8.67
Ethnic fractionalization 576 58.89 25.32 2.70 88.40
Population density 576 90.73 117.60 2.18 620.03
Per capita GDP 576 5,683.04 5,227.71 674.59 22,254.04
Per capita GDP (log) 576 8.18 1.00 6.51 10.01
Gini 576 0.58 0.09 0.34 0.78
Democracy 576 2.90 0.87 1.00 5.00
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